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Chapter 9. Greeted with a Shrug: The Impact of the Community Design 




I.  Introduction 
In an era of increased harmonization of intellectual property laws worldwide, the 
United States’ treatment of product design looks like an anomaly. Since the European 
Community Design System went into effect in 2002, advocates in the US have urged 
Congress to follow suit and adopt sui generis design protection, particularly for 
fashion.1 The US Congress, however, has resisted the call and left design protection to 
the existing standards of trademark, copyright and design patent law.2  
 
The legislature’s recalcitrance on design is not entirely a byproduct of current 
Congressional dysfunction.3 Other, more productive Congresses have considered and 
rejected design protection in the past, most notably in connection with the 1976 
overhaul of the Copyright Act.4 Then as now, the rejection of design rights arose from 
a confluence of factors, some substantive and some more pragmatic. The substantive 
concerns include the utilitarian tradition of US intellectual property law, with its 
ostensible preference for competition over exclusivity; this model eschews new forms of 
exclusive rights, except when necessary to incentivize creators and avoid market 
																																																						
* Thanks to Stuti Venkat, Sriya Coomer, and Andrew Norkiewicz for excellent research assistance. 
1 E.g., T. Mahmood, Note: Design Law in the United States as Compared to the European Community 
Design System: What Do We Need to Fix? [2014] 24 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media and Ent. L.J. 555; C. 
S. Hemphill and J. Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion [2009] 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1147; See 
generally Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. [2009]; Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 
S. 1957, 110th Cong. [2007]; Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. [2006]. 
2 See generally M. A. Lemley and M. P. McKenna, Scope [2016] 57 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 2197; M. P. 
McKenna and C.J. Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation 
[2017] 30 Harv. J.L. and Tech. 491. 
3 M. Ellement, The Supreme Court Meets a Gridlocked Congress [2016] 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 
116, 166 (noting that Congress is currently “at a standstill- increasingly unable to agree on, or even 
debate, new legislation”); J. Steinhauer and D. M. Herszenhorn, ‘Congress Recesses, Leaving More 
Stalemates Than Accomplishments’ (N.Y. Times 14 July 2016) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/us/politics/congress-recesses-leaving-more-stalemates-than-
accomplishments.html> accessed 24 November 2017.  
4 See An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Title 17 of the United States Code, and for 
Other Purposes S. 22, 94th Cong. [1975]; S. Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong. [1975]; cf. H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1476 [1976]; see generally J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: 
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976 [1983] Duke L.J. 1143, 1188-90; R. S. 
Brown, Jr., Design Protection: An Overview [1987] 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1396 (“Beginning in 1957, a 
[design] bill has been introduced in probably every Congress, in a form closely resembling the current 
model.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190550 
failure.5 This commitment to core principles, of course, tells only part of the story, 
since Congress adheres to it selectively; some new rights have emerged despite little 
evidence that they will meaningfully affect incentives or serve other utilitarian goals.6 
Nonetheless, the utilitarian foundations of US intellectual property law help to situate 
the country’s approach to design protection, in comparison to jurisdictions with 
different philosophical traditions. In particular, because US law aims to promote 
progress rather than to reward individual creators, lawmakers may resist arguments 
that prevail in jurisdictions with a stronger emphasis on rewards or moral rights.7 
 
While a commitment to utilitarianism explains some of the US resistance to sui 
generis design rights, other factors have played an important role. Definitional 
problems that have long plagued design litigation do not disappear when protection 
shifts from existing IP rights into some new legal form. Nor does sui generis protection 
solve enforcement, overlap, or patent-deference concerns. Political economy 
considerations that have supported expansions of other IP rights play out differently 
in the product design context. Perhaps most importantly, US design patent law has 
evolved into a viable form of protection for many types of design.8 Together, these 
factors have prevented the US from following Europe’s lead in adopting a regime like 
the Community Design System.  
 
The absence of sui generis design protection does not, however, mean an absence of 
legal protection for design. Despite its practical and theoretical hurdles, there is broad 
intuitive appeal to the notion that creative designers deserve some form of protection 
against copying. At times, this has led courts to find outlets for design protection 
under copyright and trademark/unfair competition law. Throughout the twentieth and 
early twenty-first century, these areas of law expanded and contracted in response to 
perceived gaps or gluts in protection for design.9 Design patent law, moreover, which 
																																																						
5 See Graham v. John Deere Co. [1966] 383 U.S. 1, 5-11 (“The inherent problem [in devising a patent 
system] was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or 
devised but for the inducement of a patent.”); see generally W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, The 
Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Belknap Press 2003) (“Skeptics of government should 
hesitate to extend a presumption of efficiency to a process by which government grants rights to exclude 
competition with the holders of the rights.”); P. S. Menell and S. Scotchmer, ‘Intellectual Property’ in: A. 
Mitchell Polinksy and S. Shavell (eds.) Handbook of Law and Economics (Elsevier 2007); see also Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson [1813] (on file with Library of Congress).  
6 See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 [1996] (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. para 1125(c)); cf. R. Tushnet, ‘Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and 
Cognitive Science’ [2008] 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507, 510 (“Dilution is, ultimately, an underevidenced concept 
and one that invites socially wasteful litigation.”); see also Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 [1998]; cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft [2004] 537 U.S. 186, 222 
(upholding copyright term extension despite scant evidence of any effect on incentives: “The wisdom of 
Congress’ action … is not within our province to second-guess”). 
7 See generally R. J. DaSilva, ‘Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights 
in France and the United States’ [1980] 28 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 1; L. Zemer, ‘Moral Rights: Limited 
Edition’ [2011] 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1519. 
8 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd. [2015] 786 F.3d 983, 1001-02; see also Sarah Burstein, 
‘Costly Designs’ [2016] 77 Ohio St. L.J. 107, 109-11. 
9 Compare, e.g., Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc. [1992] 505 U.S. 763 (“Denying protection for 
inherently distinctive nonfunctional trade dress until after secondary meaning has been established 
saw little action through the twentieth century,10 has recently emerged as a popular 
form of protection for certain types of design. Thus, in varying ways at different times, 
US law has recognized some forms of legal rights for designers. But the shifting sands, 
continuing uncertainty, and enduring gaps for short-term designs such as fashion 
have fueled the ongoing push for sui generis protection. Advocates have pointed to the 
Community Design System in support of their appeal, but to date, their calls have 
gone unanswered. 
 
This Chapter explores some of the reasons that the Community Design System has 
had so little purchase in US debates over design. It begins in Part I with an overview 
of US law’s treatment of design, including the gaps and other features that have 
fueled calls for legislative reform. Part II then turns to the recent history of design 
legislation in the US, including the role of the Community Design System in 
Congressional testimony and deliberations. That history demonstrates that, despite 
repeated pleas to follow the global trend on design, Congress has so far resisted, for 
both philosophical and practical reasons. Part III closes with some reflections on 
whether the US will ever move beyond the current impasse on design. 
1. Design Protection in the US 
 
The US’s ambivalence about new forms of design protection comes from the confluence 
of three factors: the utilitarian focus of US intellectual property law, a general 
suspicion of monopoly and preference for competition, and the hybrid nature of design. 
The first two points are interrelated: with free, competitive markets as the 
presumptive baseline, intellectual property rights are justified only because they 
either enable fair competition (trademarks), or provide necessary incentives to induce 
authorship or invention (copyrights and patents). Absent one of these justifications, 
the law presumes that market forces will bring the best results for consumers and 
society. While notions of reward and dessert undoubtedly inform intuitions about 
intellectual property rights,11 they find no basis in the Constitution, from which 
Congress receives its lawmaking authority.12 
																																																						
would allow a competitor, which has not adopted a distinctive trade dress of its own, to appropriate the 
originator’s dress in other markets and to deter the originator from expanding into and competing in 
these areas.”), with Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros Inc. [2000] 529 U.S. 205, 214 (rejecting 
possibility of “inherently distinctive” product design trade dress: “Competition is deterred, however, not 
merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of 
inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged inherent 
distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”); see generally J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and 
the Legislative Agenda [1992] 55 Law and Contemp. Problems 281, 287 (describing a cycle in which 
“chronic underprotection in industrial property law leads to chronic overprotection in artistic property 
law, which in turn inspires further reactive reforms of industrial property law tending to reinstate 
levels of underprotection that will foster renewed appeals to copyright law”). 
10 See, e.g., Brown, Design Protection, supra note 4 at 1355-57. 
11 See, e.g., W. J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property [1993] 102 Yale L.J. 1540; S. L. Dogan, ‘Harms, Benefits, and 
Justifications in Trademark Law’ [2017] (unpublished working draft) (on file with author). 
12 The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides the basis for patent and copyright 
law, while the Commerce Clause enables trademark and other unfair competition laws. See U.S. Const. 
Art. 1, para 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
 
But why, given the role of incentives in US intellectual property law, has Congress 
resisted the call for additional incentives for design?13 It’s here that the hybrid nature 
of design comes into play. Historically, as suggested by the Constitution, US law 
developed two separate tracks for protection of creative expression and functional 
innovation. These tracks – copyright and utility patent law – evolved not only to fit 
their unique subject matter, but also to steer clear of one another’s domain. From 
subject matter to eligibility requirements to infringement to defenses, courts and 
Congress crafted rules to fit the perceived needs of these distinct types of human 
creations.  
 
Patent law, for example, gives strong legal rights,14 but for a short(er) duration,15 and 
only to inventors who contribute new, non-obvious advances in some useful process or 
product.16 It aims to provide relatively prompt access to functional innovations, so that 
subsequent innovators have a broad set of building blocks from which to draw.17 The 
more fundamental building blocks – laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas – lie beyond even patent law’s reach; the law declares them “part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men … free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”18 Patent law, then, provides muscular rights, but only for eligible inventions 
and for limited times. All other useful innovations – inventions with expired patents, 
works that fail patent law’s substantive standards, and discoveries of laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas – fall into patent’s public domain. That public 
domain, moreover, is guarded to protect against propertization of these interests in 
some other name.19 Patent, in other words, has a strong interest in ensuring free 
access to the raw materials necessary for useful innovation. 
																																																						
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries”); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City [1966] 383 U.S. 1, 9 (noting Thomas Jefferson’s 
rejection of natural rights in favor of a “social and economic rationale of the patent system” that viewed 
patents as “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”); see also In re Trade-Mark Cases 
[1879] 100 U.S. 82, 89 (noting Congressional power to regulate the “fraudulent dealing in trade-marks” 
which “plainly interferes with and thwarts the power and duty of the United States to protect foreign 
and interstate trade”). 
13 See generally J.H. Reichman, supra note 9 at 283 (“Recent studies suggest that industrial design, like 
computer programs and other forms of applied scientific know-how, cannot yield long-term rewards to 
innovators if the short-term profits from successful innovation are consistently appropriated by free-
riders who do not share the costs and risks of the creative process.”). 
14 35 U.S.C. para 271. 
15 Id. at para 154. 
16 Id. at paras 101-103. 
17 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 85 at 7-9; cf. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade Inc. [1992] 977 F.2d 
1510, 1526 (“In order to enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea of functional principle underlying a work, 
the creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws.”); 
Specialized Seating Inc. v. Greenwich Indus LP [2010] 616 F.3d 722, 727 (noting goal of trademark’s 
functionality doctrine “to separate the spheres of patent and trademark law, and to ensure that the 
term of a patent is not extended beyond the period authorized by the legislature”). 
18 Funk Bros Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co. [1948] 333 U.S. 127, 130. 
19 Cf. J. E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain’, in L. 
Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.) The Future of the Public Domain (Kluwer Law International 2006), 
121-166 (exploring historical and theoretical perspectives on the “public domain” in intellectual 
 
Copyright strikes its balance differently, both for its own intrinsic reasons and out of 
deference to patent law concerns. It has a long term,20 but flimsier rights;21 it allows 
numerous exceptions;22 and it limits itself to the expressive form, rather than the 
style, idea, or philosophy underlying an author’s work.23 All of these features help to 
balance copyright’s short-term goal of incentivizing authorship with its ultimate 
objective of enabling discourse and advancing knowledge.24 But copyright also 
explicitly defers to patent law’s separate concerns, by excluding “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” from protection, 
“regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied” in 
an original work.25 Copyright, in other words, avoids giving rights in anything that 
patent law cares about. It disavows protection of features that “have their final end in 
application and use.”26 Authors cannot use copyright to claim rights over patent-
eligible innovations; nor may they claim elements that patent law has purposely 
dedicated to the public. Features that have value because they work, in other words, 
tend to fall outside the scope of copyright.27  
 
This division between the expressive and the functional makes sense as a matter of 
principle and provides a workable standard in many contexts. A chemist who writes a 
book disclosing a new chemical compound may claim copyright in the book, but must 
look to patent law for rights in the compound itself.28 Useful articles that contain some 
																																																						
property law). Creations in patent’s public domain may receive trade secret or other forms of contingent 
legal protection, but they may not obtain government-granted exclusive rights. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp. [1974] 416 U.S. 470 (holding that patent law does not preempt state trade secret 
protection). 
20 17 U.S.C. para 302. 
21 While patent gives the exclusive right to make, use, sell, or import the invention within the statutory 
term, copyright protects only against copying or other uses that derive directly from the copyright 
holder’s work. It does not protect against the independent creation of similar expression. Id. at para106. 
22 See id. at paras 107-122. 
23 Of course, drawing the line between these concepts proves difficult, as Judge Hand observed in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. [1930] 45 F.2d 119, 121 (discussing boundary between idea and 
expression: “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”). 
24 See U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8; see also Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios Inc. [1984] 
464 U.S. 417, 429 (noting copyright law’s goal of achieving “a difficult balance between the interests of 
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, 
and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other 
hand”). 
25 17 U.S.C. para 102(b). 
26 Baker v. Selden [1879] 101 U.S. 99, 104; cf. Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands Inc. [2017] 137 S. 
Ct. 1002, 1006 (although useful features in themselves cannot claim copyright, “[a]n artistic feature 
that would be eligible for copyright protection on its own cannot lose that protection simply because it 
was first created as a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful”). 
27 See Computer Associates Intern. Inc. v. Altai Inc. [1992] 982 F.2d 693, 715 (upholding district court’s 
decision that a feature of a program’s structure was “dictated by the nature of other programs with 
which it was designed to interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright”); but see Oracle Amer. Inc. v. 
Google Inc. [2014] 750 F.3d 1339, 1359-72 (upholding copyright in application program interfaces, 
despite their function in enabling communications between layers in a computer system). 
28 See generally Baker, supra note 25 at 104. 
purely aesthetic feature – say, the pattern on a sofa’s fabric,29 or a statuette that 
serves as a lamp base but adds nothing to the utility of the lamp30 – may receive 
copyright protection for those features.31 In each of these situations, the work contains 
certain features that contribute to its utility, and others that are purely expressive. 
The useful features (the chemical compound, the shape and feel of the couch, and the 
mechanics and illuminating features of the light) fall into patent law’s domain, and 
beyond the reach of copyright. The expressive features, in contrast (the text of the 
chemistry book, the pattern of the fabric, and the shape and colors of the statuette) 
may qualify under copyright, but not patent. This divide is neither accidental nor 
compromising: it reflects a recognition that copyright and patent rights have evolved 
specifically to fit their subject matter, and a belief that any mismatch between right 
and subject matter could come with significant social costs. 32 
 
The problem with design, of course, is that it straddles the patent/copyright divide. In 
its most general sense, design reflects the “purpose or planning that exists behind an 
action, fact, or object.”33 While at some points in history “art” was viewed as 
“something to be applied as an accessory to a design,”34 today “we see the beauty of an 
artifact – its ‘art’ … - as an integral part of its design.”35 That art, moreover, often 
pervades the design in a way that makes it hard to extricate aesthetics from function, 
as traditional patent and copyright law demand. Indeed, research has shown that even 
when they might appear separable, aesthetics and function may have a synergistic 
relationship because “people perceive more-aesthetic designs as easier to use than 
less-aesthetic designs – whether they are or not.”36 As a result, granting copyright in 
the aesthetic aspects of many designs risks giving rights over their functional aspects 
as well, which would violate the mandate that copyright stay out of patent’s territory. 
It would also defy the normative principle behind that rule: that the public deserves 
																																																						
29 See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp. [1977] 558 F.2d 1090. 
30 See Mazer v. Stein [1954] 347 U.S. 201. 
31 The Copyright Act provides that the design of a “useful article” – one that has “an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the article or to convey information” – may be protected “if, and 
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.” 17 U.S.C. para 101. 
32 See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian [1971] 446 F.2d 738, 741 (“Obviously a 
copyright must not be treated as equivalent to a patent lest long continuing private monopolies be 
conferred over areas of gainful activity without first satisfying the substantive and procedural 
prerequisites to the grant of such privileges.”). 
33 Design, Oxford English Dictionary Online, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/design> 
accessed 26 September 2017. 
34 C. Fiell and P. Fiell, The Story of Design: From the Paleolithic to the Present (The Monacelli Press 
2016). 
35 Id.; see also Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands Inc. [2017] 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1034 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“great industrial design may well include design that is inseparable from the useful article 
– where, as Frank Lloyd Wright put it, ‘form and function are one’”) (quoting F. Wright, Frank Lloyd 
Wright: An Autobiography 146 (reprint 2005) [1943]); M. P. McKenna and K. J. Strandburg, ‘Progress 
and Competition in Design’ [2013] 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1. 
36 See W. Lidwell et al., Universal Principles of Design (Rockport Publishers 2003) (describing this 
phenomenon as the “aesthetic-usability effect”). 
broad and prompt access to the building blocks of functional innovation.37 Denying 
protection, on the other hand, deprives designers of copyright’s rewards (and 
incentives) for their original expression.  
 
This tension – between the desire to incentivize original expression and caution about 
tying up functional tools – has plagued copyright since Congress first extended 
protection to works of applied art in 1909.38 The current Copyright Act allows 
protection of expressive features of functional objects so long as those “features … can 
be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.”39 This “separability” doctrine has perplexed the 
courts, who have struggled with what it means for a feature to be separately 
“identifi[able]” despite its physical embodiment in a useful object.40 Star Athletica v. 
Varsity Brands, the Supreme Court’s recent foray into separability, did little to clarify 
things; in upholding the copyright on the surface decorations on cheerleading 
uniforms, the Court left unanswered questions about how it would handle three-
dimensional objects whose function is inextricably melded with their form. On its face, 
the Court’s standard for separability appears broad enough to include virtually any 
visually appealing object: “a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for 
copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the useful article, it would 
qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in 
some other tangible medium.”41 Yet the Court makes clear that its rule would not 
allow copyright in either the “shape, cut, and physical dimensions of the cheerleading 
uniforms,”42 or in “a shovel as a shovel.”43 Star Athletica thus fails to resolve the 
ongoing uncertainty about copyright protection for three-dimensional design. Because 
																																																						
37 See generally Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Intern. Inc. [1995] 49 F.3d 807, 819 (J. Boudin, 
concurring) (“It is no accident that patent protection has preconditions that copyright protection does 
not – notably, the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness – and that patents are granted for a 
shorter period than copyrights.”); cf. Jay Franco and Sons Inc. v. Franek [2010] 615 F.3d 855, 859. The 
implications for patent-eligible and non-patent eligible features are related but distinct. For patent-
eligible features, denying copyright protection drives the inventor to the form of protection better 
calibrated for functional inventions, with its disclosure requirements and relatively short term. For non-
patent-eligible useful features, denying copyright protection wards against an end-run of patent 
requirements, which could ironically lock up non-inventive building blocks for a time far exceeding the 
patent term. See Baker v. Selden [1879] 101 U.S. 99, 102 (noting concerns over the use of copyright law 
to circumvent patent law’s substantive standards, short term, and disclosure requirements).  
38 See Mazer v. Stein [1954] 347 U.S. 201, 208-14. 
39 17 U.S.C. para 101. 
40 See generally Star Athletica, supra note 35 at 1018 and n. 1 (J. Ginsburg, concurring) (“Courts ‘have 
struggled mightily to formulate a test’ for the separability analysis”) (quoting Star Athletica L.L.C. v. 
Varsity Brands Inc. [2015] 799 F.3d 468, 484); see also Mazer v. Stein [1954] 347 U.S. 201. 
41 Star Athletica, supra note 35 at 1012 (emphasis added) and 1014 (“An artistic feature that would be 
eligible for copyright protection on its own cannot lose that protection simply because it was first 
created as a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful.”). 
42 Id. at 1016 (“our test does not render the shape, cut, and physical dimensions of the cheerleading 
uniforms eligible for copyright protection,” presumably because they fail the separability test). 
43 Id. at 1013 and n.2 (noting that if a “shovel included any artistic features that could be perceived as 
art apart from the shovel, and which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works 
on their own or in another medium, they too could be copyrighted but a shovel as a shovel cannot”) 
(emphasis added). 
the case involves only surface ornamentation, the opinion avoids the fundamental 
question of how to protect expression while respecting patent law’s commitment to its 
public domain. 
 
While the ongoing struggle over the domains of patent and copyright does not speak 
directly to the merits of sui generis design protection, it offers some hints about the 
challenges confronting design legislation in the United States. Generally, it 
demonstrates a longstanding assumption in US law that the “functional” and the 
“expressive” lend themselves to different forms of legal protection that are calibrated 
to their needs. More specifically, it reflects a discomfort with exclusive rights in useful 
features, except when they have undergone the rigors of patent examination. When 
combined with the general presumption in favor of access and competitive markets, 
these factors provide a powerful force for the status quo and against new rights. 
 
These same factors have shaped the development of trademark protection for product 
design. US trademark law protects product features, such as shape and color, whose 
consistent usage over time has led consumers to associate them with a single source.44 
Unlike patent and copyright law, however, US trademark law does not view 
incentivizing such features as its raison d’être.45 The law does not aim to encourage 
investment in appealing marks, nor does it treat marks as having any intrinsic social 
value apart from their informational function.46 Instead, US trademark law views 
marks as informational devices, and protects them to guard against misinformation in 
markets, with the ultimate goal of making markets more competitive.47 It’s not that 
trademark law has nothing to do with incentives or rewards, but the incentives and 
rewards of trademark focus on the trademark holder’s investment in its reputation, 
rather than investment in the creation of a work (i.e., a trademark) that itself 
functions or entertains.48 The law does not – at least deliberately – seek to incentivize 
the creation of marks based on their aesthetic appeal, function, or other inherent 
value. It seeks to enable informed and competitive markets.  
 
Given trademark law’s focus on competition, it shares (and amplifies) copyright’s 
skepticism about locking up features that enhance product function. In trademark 
law, this skepticism plays out through the functionality doctrine, which bars 
																																																						
44 See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc. [2000] 529 U.S. 205, 212-16. 
45 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc. [2001] 532 U.S. 23, 34 (“The Lanham Act 
does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the 
purpose of the patent law and its [limited] period of exclusivity.”).  
46 The law acknowledges that trademarks (particularly trade dress) often make the product more 
attractive; that alone does not justify denial of trademark protection. “The chief difficulty is 
distinguishing between designs that are fashionable enough to be functional and those that are merely 
pleasing.” Jay Franco and Sons Inc. v. Franek [2010] 615 F.3d 855, 860. 
47 See S. L. Dogan and M. A. Lemley, ‘The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?’ 
[2005] 54 Emory L.J. 461 at 467 (“Trademark law … aims to promote more competitive markets by 
improving the quality of information in those markets.”). 
48 Id. at 468 (“Trademark law quite deliberately does not serve” incentive-related goals; “both its 
philosophy and its structure reject the notion that trademark rights should serve as either an 
inducement or a reward for the creation of product features that have inherent – as opposed to source-
identifying – value.”). 
trademark protection for any feature that is “essential to the use or purpose of [a] 
device” or “affects the cost or quality of the device.”49  
 
For a time in the late twentieth century, some courts interpreted functionality 
narrowly, using it to deny protection only for features that had no effective 
substitutes. Thus, features that contributed to a product’s function or ease of use could 
be protected, as long as the trademark holder could point to alternative ways to 
accomplish that function in competitors’ products.50 This “competitive necessity” 
approach viewed the purpose of functionality as enabling competitive markets; as long 
as a particular feature was not essential to competition, the reasoning went, it made 
sense to protect it if it played any signaling role to consumers.51 
 
In TrafFix v. Marketing Displays,52 however, the Supreme Court rejected the 
competition-focused view of functionality in favor of one that blended competition 
concerns with patent-deference considerations. The plaintiff in TrafFix had sought 
trade dress protection for a road sign’s “dual spring device,” which enabled the sign to 
sway in the wind without falling over. The court of appeals had found the spring 
device non-functional, because competitors had viable alternatives, including the 
option of using the same spring and covering it up.53 The Supreme Court reversed, in 
an opinion that rejected the competitive necessity test as a “comprehensive definition” 
of functionality.54 While endorsing competitive necessity in cases involving aesthetic 
product features,55 the Court found it inapt for features that are “essential to the use 
or purpose” of a product or “affect[ its] cost or quality.”56 For such features, it is 
irrelevant whether alternatives exist; the feature cannot serve as a trademark.57 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the same normative principle that 
drives the patent/copyright divide: the notion that patent law – and not copyright or 
trademark – is the sole arbiter of exclusive rights in functional innovation.58 
																																																						
49 TrafFix, supra note 45 at 33.  
50 See, e.g., Marketing Displays Inc. v. TrafFix Devices Inc. [1999] 200 F.3d 929, 940 (holding that a 
dual-spring mechanism at the base of a road sign could receive trademark protection, because 
competitors could use the same springs but cover them to make the feature not visible to consumers). 
51 See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods. Inc. [1982] 671 F.2d 1332, 1337 (“when a design is ‘non-
functional,’ the right to compete through imitation gives way, presumably upon balance of that right 
with the originator’s right to prevent others from infringing upon an established system of trade 
identification”). 
52 TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc. [2001] 532 U.S. 23. 
53 Marketing Displays, 200 F.3d at 940. 
54 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33.  
55 See id. at 32-33 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. [1995] 514 U.S. 159, 165). 
56 Id. at 33. 
57 See id. (aesthetic functionality (and the availability of alternatives) applies only when the feature has 
no “bearing on the use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality”). 
58 Id. at 34 (“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a 
particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. … Whether there is 
a utility patent or there has been no utility patent at all, a product design which has a particular 
appearance may be functional because it is ‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the 
cost or quality of the article.’”); see also McKenna and Strandburg, supra note 35 at 23 (“Because 
‘unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions’ provide ‘the baseline of free competition’ that produces 
 
For the most part, post-TrafFix courts have taken the Supreme Court at its word and 
rejected trade dress claims to elements that contribute to a product’s function, 
distinguishing between such features (which are always functional) and “arbitrary, 
incidental, or ornamental aspects of features” (which may be functional under 
aesthetic functionality’s competition-focused standard).59 Unless a trademark claimant 
can point to a “feature that contributes no demonstrable benefit to the operation or 
efficiency of the designed product,”60 it will likely fail the TrafFix functionality test. As 
a result, like copyright, trademark law offers few options for designs whose aesthetic 
appeal blends inextricably with function. 
 
With copyright protection unclear and trademark protection unattainable for many 
valuable design features, a third option – design patent – has recently emerged as a 
viable alternative for many types of design. US design patent law allows protection for 
“any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”61 Design 
patents last for fifteen years from the date of grant.62 The process of obtaining a design 
patent resembles that of utility patents: the applicant submits an application with the 
Patent and Trademark Office, which subjects it to a substantive review. Like utility 
patents, design patents require novelty63 and non-obviousness64 of the design. Unlike 
utility patents, however, design patents cover only “ornamental” features of 
products.65 Design patents thus cover completely different features than utility 
patents. “While utility patents protect ‘the way an article is used and works,’ design 
patents protect ‘the way an article looks.’”66 Of course, it’s no easy task to distinguish 
between the two; as discussed below, design patent’s own functionality doctrine 
attempts to mediate between form and function. In contrast to copyright and 
																																																						
the ‘ordinary innovation’ upon which the patent incentive builds, trade dress law subordinates its static 
competition goals to patent law’s dynamic goals.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Groeneveld Transport Efficiency Inc. v. Lubecore International Inc. [2013] 730 F.3d 494, 505 
(affirming lower court’s finding of functionality when “all the elements of [the claimed] pump are there 
for some practical benefit or reason,” and when trademark claimant had not presented evidence of a 
“purely ornamental feature that contributes no demonstrable benefit to the operation or efficiency of the 
designed product”) (internal quotations omitted); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent 
America Holdings Inc. [2012] 696 F.3d 206, 219-20 (“when the aesthetic design of a product is itself the 
mark for which protection is sought, we may also deem the mark functional if giving the markholder 
the right to use it exclusively ‘would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage’”) (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).  
60 Groeneveld, id. at 505. 
61 35 U.S.C. para 171. Design patents must also satisfy the general requirements for utility patents, 
including non-obviousness, novelty, and disclosure. Id. 
62 Id. at para 173. For applications filed before May 13, 2015, the term was fourteen years from the date 
of grant. 
63 Id. at para102. 
64 Id. at para103. 
65 Id. at para171(a). Patented designs must also be “original,” but the originality requirement is rarely 
at issue. See generally Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp.[2009] 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (“The 
purpose of incorporating an originality requirement is unclear; it likely was designed to incorporate the 
copyright concept of originality—requiring that the work be original with the author…”). 
66 Burstein, supra note 8 at 112 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Off., Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure para 1502.01 [9th ed., Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015]). 
trademark law, however, design patent offers a form of protection that is arguably 
better suited to aesthetically appealing industrial design, because it expires after a 
relatively short duration.  
 
For most of the twentieth century, design patents saw little action because of their 
reputation as expensive, cumbersome, substantively demanding, and narrowly 
construed.67 Since the turn of the century, however, design patents have enjoyed a 
renaissance, with soaring application numbers and high profile infringement suits.68 
Although many factors have contributed to this shift, three developments proved 
critical: trademark law’s retreat from broad design protection,69 a softening of the 
rigorous standards for obtaining a design patent,70 and a Federal Circuit decision that 
eased the burden of proving design patent infringement.71 Together, these changes 
have led to an explosion in design patent acquisition and litigation. 
 
																																																						
67 See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 13 at 286 (“the design patent law still requires a full examination of 
the prior art, which makes it too costly, slow and cumbersome for the bulk of the commercial designs 
competing in today’s fast-paced consumer markets”); Brown, supra note 4 at 1356 (describing design 
patent as “a Cinderella who never goes to the ball,” and listing a number of “reasons why design patents 
are held in low esteem”); P. J. Saidman, ‘The Crisis in the Law of Designs’ [2007] 89 J. Pat. and 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 301; see also Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 8 at 109-11. 
68 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963-2015, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, 
<https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm> accessed 28 September 2017 (showing 
increase from 18,292 design patent applications in 2000 to 39,097 in 2015); see also Samsung 
Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc. [2016] 137 S. Ct. 429, 433-34 (describing history of litigation between Apple 
and Samsung over iPhone design patents); Crocs v. ITC [2010] 598 F.3d 1294; see generally P. Lee and 
M. Sunder, ‘Design Patents: Law Without Design’, [2013] 17 Stanford Tech. L. Rev. 277, 278-79. 
69 The retreat occurred in two steps. The Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. 
Samara Bros. Inc. [2000] 529 U.S. 205, limited product-design trade dress protection to features that 
have acquired secondary meaning among consumers. Four years later, the Court decided TrafFix, with 
its aggressive approach to functionality. See supra notes 52-58. Together, these decisions substantially 
narrowed the universe of product features that could qualify for trade dress protection. 
70 See generally Burstein, supra note 8 at 139-141 (“The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which has had exclusive appellate jurisdiction in design patent cases since 1982, has quietly eroded the 
statutory requirements for design patentability to the point where it is extremely difficult for the PTO 
to reject design patent applications on the merits.”); S. Burstein, ‘Moving Beyond the Standard 
Criticisms of Design Patents’ [2013] 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 305 at 324-28. 
71 Egyptian Goddess Inc. v. Swisa Inc. [2008] 543 F.3d 665 (en banc). In Egyptian Goddess, the appeals 
court abandoned the “point of novelty” requirement for design patent infringement, thus allowing a 
showing of infringement based on the overall appearance of two designs. Id. at 670 (“[I]f, in the eyes of 
an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially 
the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”). 
While its rise is still nascent, under-theorized,72 and largely untested,73 design patent 
may have the staying power that copyright and trademark lack for protection of 
product design. For one thing, unlike these other forms of intellectual property, design 
patent has a relatively short term,74 which reduces (but does not eliminate) the overall 
social costs of granting rights in product features. It has an examination process and 
qualitative standards that at least theoretically weed out non-novel or obvious 
variations on existing art.75 Its disclosure requirement provides notice of the existence 
and scope of design patent claims.76 And design patent has a functionality standard 
that, like copyright and trademark’s versions, shows some deference to utility patent 
as the exclusive domain for useful innovation. Design patent’s functionality doctrine is 
somewhat narrower than trademark’s, excluding only those features that are “dictated 
by function.”77 The Federal Circuit, moreover, has repeatedly upheld “narrow” design 
patents that consist of purportedly ornamental combinations of functional elements.78 
Design patent law thus allows claims that trademark and copyright would likely 
eschew.79 Even so, the combination of moderate utility patent deference with limited 
terms suggests that design patents are better calibrated than either trademark or 
copyright law to protect the overall ornamental appearance of designs that blend form 
with function. 
																																																						
72 This is changing fast; numerous scholars have turned their attention to design patents in the past 
decade. See, e.g., J. J. DuMont and M. D. Janis, ‘The Origins of American Design Patent Protection’ 
[2013], 88 Ind. L.J. 837; S. Burstein, ‘The Patented Design’ [2015] 83 Tenn. L. Rev. 161; S. Burstein, 
‘Visual Invention’ [2012] 16 Lewis and Clark L. Rev. 169, 175; J. M. Mueller and D. Harris Brean, 
‘Overcoming the “Impossible Issue” of Nonobviousness in Design Patents’ [2011] 99 Ky. L.J. 419; and 
the articles published in Volume 17 of the Stanford Technology Law Review [2013] 
<https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-
review/online/vol17issue1_0.pdf> accessed 24 November 2017. 
73 Although the Federal Circuit has issued plenty of design patent opinions in recent years, the 
Supreme Court has not decided a substantive design patent case since the 1800s. See Smith v. Whitman 
Saddle Co. [1893] 148 U.S. 674. Its only recent design patent opinion involved damages, and the Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit’s plaintiff-friendly interpretation of the damages provision in the design 
patent law. See Samsung v. Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429. 
74 35 U.S.C. para 173 (providing for term of fifteen years from date of grant). 
75 Id. at paras 171, 102, 103. 
76 Cf. J. Bessen and M. J. Meurer, Patent Failure (Princeton University Press 2009) (“Property can fail 
when boundary information is not publicly accessible,” and “when the boundaries of the rights are not 
clear and predictable.”). 
77 See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. Covidien Inc. [2015] 796 F.3d 1312, 1334. 
78 See, e.g., id. at 1334 (“Thus, although the Design Patents do not protect the general design concept of 
an open trigger, torque knob, and activation button in a particular configuration, they nevertheless 
have some scope – the particular ornamental designs of those underlying elements.”); Sport Dimension 
Inc. v. Coleman Co. Inc. [2016] 820 F.3d 1316, 1323 (agreeing with district court that the armbands and 
side torso tapering of life jackets were functional, but nonetheless concluding that the court should have 
included these features in evaluating infringement: “the armbands and side torso tapering serve a 
functional purpose, so the fact finder should not focus on the particular designs of these elements when 
determining infringement, but rather focus on what these elements contribute to the design’s overall 
ornamentation”). 
79 It remains to be seen whether Star Athletica will apply broadly to three-dimensional features of 
industrial designs; if it does, it may result in significant overlap between copyright and design patent, 
because the Supreme Court’s emphasis on whether a feature could be “imagined” apart from the useful 
article comes close to the Federal Circuit’s inquiry into the “overall ornamentation” reflected in an 
industrial design. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012; see also Sport Dimension, 820 F.3d at 1316. 
 
Better calibrated, of course, does not mean perfect, and as design patents have surged 
in popularity, critics have warned that their proliferation may cause thickets and 
other anticompetitive effects.80 These effects multiply when courts allow design 
patent-holders to leverage their periods of exclusivity into potentially perpetual trade 
dress rights.81 These concerns suggest that courts should shape design patent law with 
caution; in particular, they should incorporate rigor into design patent standards, and 
reconsider the wisdom of allowing trademark protection for previously patented 
designs.82 But at least compared to trademark and copyright, design patent is better 
tailored to its subject matter; and as Sarah Burstein has argued, the expense and 
effort associated with design patents may well weed out some trivial innovations and 
reduce the risk of thickets.83 In any event, in the long arc of US intellectual property 
history, the renewed interest in design patents has relieved some of the pressure 
toward new forms of protection for design. 
 
Design patent’s newfound popularity, however, has not entirely quelled the call for sui 
generis design rights, particularly in the area of fashion. Critics contend that, even if 
design patents provide adequate protection for some types of design, they do not meet 
the needs of fast-moving industries like fashion.84 Design patents take an average of 
over nineteen months to issue – an eternity for an industry that introduces new 
designs every season.85 And prosecuting a design patent requires a significant 
financial investment.86 As a result, while large fashion houses have turned to design 
patents to protect “staple items” such as shoes and purses,87 smaller, more garment-
																																																						
80 See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 8 at 129-132 (describing social costs associated with bad design 
patents); Lee and Sunder, supra note 68 at 290-293. 
81 Because design patent owners have a guaranteed period of exclusivity in the sale of products bearing 
their design, they can often demonstrate that the design has acquired secondary meaning at the 
expiration of the design patent term. See Burstein, supra note 80 at 131. And many courts have 
(erroneously, in my view) held that a feature’s non-functionality under design patent law means that it 
is non-functional as a matter of trademark law. See generally S. Burstein, ‘Commentary: Faux Amis in 
Design Law’ [2015] 105 Trademark Rep. 1455, 1458-59 (criticizing this line of cases); see also M. P. 
McKenna, ‘(Dys)functionality’ [2011] 48 Hous. L. Rev. 823, 843. 
82 McKenna and Burstein have demonstrated the folly – and the costs – of the current approach. See 
Burstein, supra note 81; McKenna, supra note 81.  
83 Burstein, supra note 8. 
84 See, e.g., Hemphill and Suk, supra note 1 at 1150 and n.10; S. Scafidi, ‘Intellectual Property and 
Fashion Design’, in P. K. Yu (ed) Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Copyright and Related 
Rights (Greenwood Publishing Group 2006) at 115. 
85 See Data Visualization Center: Patents Dashboard: Design Traditional Total Pendency, U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, <https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml?CTNAVID=1006> 
accessed 28 September 2017. 
86 Basic design patent filing fees come to $760 for large entities, $380 for small entities, and $190 for 
micro-entities. See USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
<https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule> accessed 28 
September 2017. Because most applicants also hire attorneys or patent agents to prepare design 
drawings and to prosecute their applications, overall fees can run into thousands of dollars.  
87 See The Fashion Law, ‘Currently Trending in Fashion: Design Patents’, 
<http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/currently-trending-in-fashion-design-patents> accessed 24 
November 2017. 
focused designers have less to gain from the design patent regime. And even well-
heeled designers complain of design patent’s inadequacy in protecting against “fast-
fashion” copying, through which “thousands of inexpensive copies of a new design can 
be produced, from start to finish, in six weeks or less.”88 These industry-specific 
concerns provide both the engine and the backdrop for the perennial push for sui 
generis fashion legislation.  
 
II. US Design Legislation and the Role of the Community Design System 
 
Over the past decade, the United States Congress has considered several different 
iterations of design legislation, with a particular emphasis on fashion.89 While 
specifics vary, all of the bills would extend some form of short-term protection to 
original fashion designs.90 Early bills required prompt registration, and allowed for a 
three-year term;91 more recent legislation would offer automatic protection for three 
years after a design is made available to the public.92 Drafters have also tweaked the 
standards for eligibility and infringement.93 Although the two most recent bills have 
made it through the Senate Judiciary Committee and proceeded to the Senate floor,94 
none has yet seen a vote by either the Senate or the House.  
 
The witness testimony and lawmaker commentary about these bills offer insight into 
why Congress has not (yet) followed Europe in adopting a new design law. It’s not for 
lack of awareness of the Community Design System and similar laws around the 
world. To the contrary, the global trend toward design protection plays a recurrent 
role in the legislative debate.95 Instead, the record shows legislators intuitively drawn 
																																																						
88 Hemphill and Suk, supra note 1 at 1171. 
89 See, e.g., A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code, to Provide Protection for Fashion Design, H.R. 
5055, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Mar. 30, 2006) (“H.R. 5055”); Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 
S.1957, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Aug. 2, 2007); Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 
110th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced April 25, 2007); Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention 
Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Aug. 5, 2010) (“IDPPPA”); Innovative Design Protection 
Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Sept. 10, 2012) (“IDPA”). 
90 Each of the Acts would amend the Copyright Act by broadening an existing sui generis provision 
focused on vessel hulls. See H.R. 5055, supra note 89 at para1; see also 17 U.S.C. para 1301(a). 
91 H.R. 5055, supra note 89 at para1 (c-e). 
92 See IDPPA, supra note 89 at para 2(d, f). 
93 Compare, e.g., H.R. 5055 (providing protection to any original “fashion design”), with IDPPPA para 
2(a)(7](B) (limiting protection to designs that “provide a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-
utilitarian variation over prior designs for similar types of articles”). 
94 See IDPPPA (placed on Senate legislative calendar Dec. 6, 2010); S. Rep. No. 112-259 [2012]. 
95 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 2 [2012] (“In terms of the protections available to designers, … the 
United States remains at a disadvantage compared to the European Union, with which we compete to 
be the global center of the fashion industry.”); Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet [2011] 112th 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (“2011 Hearing”) (Statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (“Most industrialized nations 
provide legal protection for fashion designs. However, in the United States, the world’s leader in 
innovation and creativity, fashion designs are not protected by traditional intellectual property 
regimes.”); Design Law – Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries?: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property [2008] 110th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (“2008 
Hearing”) (Statement of William T. Fryer, III) (describing “design protection – protection when you go 
to the idea of protecting designers, but grappling with the fit between these fashion 
bills and the normative goals of US intellectual property law. Equivocal economic 
evidence, concerns about chill, and definitional questions that have long plagued 
design protection have sowed doubt about the wisdom of the design bills; as a practical 
matter, the relative modesty of the fashion industry’s political footprint no doubt 
contributes to the inertia. 
 
 
1. Equivocal economics.  
 
Incentives. As discussed above, the US intellectual property tradition views 
intellectual property rights through a utilitarian lens, which emphasizes social welfare 
considerations over rewards to creators. As a result, although advocates of design 
legislation routinely appeal to intuitive notions of fairness, their success depends on 
their ability to persuade legislators that society – not just designers – will be better off 
with design protection than without it. Incentives lie at the heart of their pitch: 
without design protection, the argument goes, rip-offs will leave designers unable to 
capture the full value of their work. The resulting underinvestment in design will 
deter future designers from entering the field, leaving consumers worse off and 
harming the national economy. 
 
Not surprisingly, proponents of design legislation and their Congressional sponsors 
have relied heavily on this incentives-based narrative. Representative Bob Goodlatte, 
a sponsor of the 2011 Innovative Design and Piracy Protection Act, extolled the need 
for fashion protection to provide the “incentive … necessary to maintain America’s 
position as the world leader in innovation.”96 Witnesses warned that current fashion 
copying “undermines incentives”97 and predicted that, “in the long term, lack of 
protection will shrink American businesses and provoke the loss of American jobs.”98 
 
Despite the visceral appeal of this incentives story, however, critics contend that it 
relies on intuition and anecdote rather than hard economic data. Indeed, Christopher 
Sprigman and Kal Raustiala have argued that knock-offs and other imitations benefit 
the fashion industry by creating trends, which drive demand for fashion and thus 
																																																						
into the market, the entry-level protection” as “a trend across the world,” and mentioning Europe 
specifically); id. at 19 (Statement of Rep. William D. Delahunt) (“Europe, Japan and India have 
protection for 15–25 years for registered designs and we have nothing.”); id. at 22 (Statement of 
Narcisco Rodriguez) (“Other developed countries such as Europe, Japan and India all provide 15 to 20 
years of protection for fashion designs. Since there is no protection in the U.S., companies have emerged 
with piracy as their business model.”). 
96 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 1 (Statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
97 Id. at 15 (Statement of Jeannie Suk) (contending that “blatant replication … most directly takes 
profits from the original producer and thus most undermines the incentive to create that federal 
copyright law aims to foster”).  
98 Id. at 8 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez); see also id. at 9 (“Without this legislation, the creativity 
and innovation that has put American fashion in a leadership position will dry up.”). 
sustain a thriving market.99 As Sprigman testified before Congress, “For fashion, 
copying does not deter innovation. It speeds it up.”100 Other scholars disagree. Scott 
Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, for example, distinguish between imitation – which fosters 
innovation and supports a vibrant fashion economy – and exact, fast-fashion copies – 
which, they contend, drain revenues and dampen incentives for designers.101 
 
Whatever the merits of these competing visions of the design industry, advocates of 
design protection have to grapple with one uncomfortable truth: the industry has 
flourished without the legal protection that they seek. Indeed, the industry’s own 
witnesses celebrate the explosion of fashion design in the US.102 As designer Narcisco 
Rodriguez testified in 2008, “More and more young Americans are going into fashion, 
and America now leads the world in fashion design.”103 This does not, of course, 
disprove the notion that designers lose money from copying, or that greater protection 
might draw even more young Americans into the industry. But it does call into 
question the premise upon which the industry’s utilitarian argument relies: that lack 
of protection will result in market failure and underinvestment in fashion design.104 
 
A similar disconnect appears in proponents’ arguments regarding licensing. To 
support their claim that the bills will benefit consumers, advocates predict that legal 
protection will enable designers to license their work to low-cost manufacturers, who 
will then sell them at affordable prices.105 Again, however, the industry’s own 
witnesses undermine this claim by showing that such licensing already occurs.106 
While a legal right would give designers more leverage in licensing negotiations (and 
may well increase prices for consumers), advocates have yet to make the case that it is 
essential. Indeed, licensing to affordable manufacturers could well decrease in a world 
																																																						
99 See K. Raustiala and C. J. Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design’ [2006] 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687. 
100 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 75 (Statement of Christopher Sprigman).  
101 See Hemphill and Suk, supra note 1. 
102 See also 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 6 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez) (noting that “fashion has 
grown to a $340 billion industry in the US”). 
103 2008 Hearing, supra note 95 at 24 (Statement of Narcisco Rodriguez). 
104 See also Raustiala and Sprigman, supra note 99; 2008 Hearing, supra note 95 at 30 (Statement of 
Steve Maiman) (“Over many years, the fashion industry has done very well. It has grown into a huge, 
competitive, innovative and vibrant industry, all without the help or interference from this particular 
type of copyright law.”). 
105 E.g., 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 8 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez) (contending that design 
rights will facilitate licensing deals); id. at 14 (Statement of Jeannie Suk). 
106 E.g., 2011 Hearing, supra note 95 at 8 (Statement of Lazaro Hernandez) (describing “American 
designers who have collaborated” with low-cost retailers, including “Isaac Mizrahi at Target, Isabel 
Toledo at Payless, Norma Kamali at Wal-Mart, Mary Kate and Ashley Olsen at JC Penney, Billy Reid 
at J.Crew, Diane von Furstenberg at Gap and Vera Wang at Kohl’s. These stores have all seen the 
value of making the works of American designers available in their stores through licensing deals so 
that designers get paid for their innovation and creativity”); id. at 14 (Statement of Jeannie Suk) 
(“Many extremely talented designers … have partnered with high-volume retailers, such as Target and 
HandM, to offer their designs in large numbers at a low price. The ID3PA encourages this kind of 
partnership because this allows designers to profit from the creative labor they invest in their original 
designs.”). 
of exclusive design rights; it seems plausible that the threat of competition from 
copyists may have brought designers to the table in the first place. 
 
Compounding these questions about the incentive effects of design protection are 
concerns about its costs.  
 
Deadweight loss and increased consumer prices. As with any form of exclusive rights, 
design protection would likely raise the price that consumers pay to access some 
appealing designs.107 Of course, the prospect of such supra-competitive pricing comes 
with the territory in intellectual property; it generates the profits that give rights-
holders reason to invest in creating valuable works. But if creators would innovate 
even without the promise of these excess profits, the higher prices cause unnecessary 
deadweight loss and a wealth transfer away from consumers. 
 
Definitional problems and the risk of chill. Even if the incentive story indicated a clear 
risk of market failure and a need for protection for design, design protection raises 
difficult definitional questions that risk chilling legitimate conduct and suppressing 
competition. These problems were especially acute in early versions of the design 
legislation, which adopted broad definitions of protected subject matter and 
infringement.108 Later bills narrowed the right’s subject matter and scope, limiting 
protection to “unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation[s]” on 
existing designs and defining infringing works as copies that are “substantially 
identical” to the “overall visual appearance” of the protected design.109 Despite these 
clarifications, experience suggests that determining the validity and scope of design 
rights will prove fact-intensive and often indeterminate. The lack of a registration 
requirement compounds these notice problems, leaving would-be imitators with three 
choices: hiring counsel to evaluate the risk of an infringement suit, plunging forward 
and risking litigation, or choosing not to copy.110 Any of these choices raises costs, 
which will inevitably pass on to consumers. 
 
If the need for design incentives were sufficiently strong, of course, it could overcome 
these objections. In fact, though, the economic record provides meager support for the 
fashion industry’s claim that design protection will increase overall social welfare, the 
prerequisite for new intellectual property rights in the US. The 2012 bill made it to 
the Senate floor despite these shortcomings, but progressed no further. Undoubtedly, 
the equivocal economic picture at least partially explains why. Indeed, some Senators 
on the Judiciary Committee (where the bill was introduced) opposed it precisely 
because of concerns that it could “upset a well-functioning market” and harm 
																																																						
107 See S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 10 [2012] (Minority Views of Senators Coburn, Cornyn, Lee, and 
Sessions). 
108 The 2006 legislation would have prohibited the making or importing of any design substantially 
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110 See, e.g., 2008 Hearing, supra note 95 at 32-33 (Statement of Steve Maiman). 
consumers.111 In a separate statement to the Senate Report accompanying the bill, 
these Senators noted the “lively debate” over the economics of design protection, and 
cautioned that “absent a stronger showing that a practice is systematic and harmful to 
the market as a whole, the threat of encroachment on liberty represented by any 
congressional enactment tips the balance against government intervention in the 
private market.”112  
 
 
1. Politics, power, and pendulum swings.  
The lack of compelling economic support for fashion rights provides a plausible, but 
incomplete, picture of why the legislation has repeatedly stalled in Congress. In the 
recent past, Congress has often pointed to global norms as justification for expanding 
intellectual property rights,113 so one might expect it to follow Europe’s lead in 
creating a sui generis regime. And if Congress conditioned new intellectual property 
rights on a demonstrated need for incentives, the US intellectual property landscape 
would look quite different than it does today.114 Equivocal economic evidence alone, 
then, can’t explain the impasse on design. The rest of the story likely owes itself to 
some combination of politics and timing. 
 
First, unlike many of the more established “IP industries,” the fashion industry has 
neither the economic footprint nor the political clout to command much attention in 
Washington.115 Thus, while some sponsors like New York Senator Chuck Schumer 
have a sizable constituency that cares about design rights, the design industry plays a 
fairly minor role in the national economy and political debate, at least relative to the 
collective “content industries” that include music, movie, software, and book 
publishers. The existence of major discount retailers with interests on the other side, 
moreover, only further weakens the political force behind the drive for fashion 
protection.  
 
Second, this latest round of fashion legislation comes at a time of (relative) skepticism 
about overly broad intellectual property rights. Congress has, in recent years, worried 
over patent trolls and trademark bullies, and scholars have demonstrated that 
intellectual property rights can impose substantial costs and hamper innovation 
																																																						
111 S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 10 [2012]. 
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115 See K. Abnett, ‘Money Well Spent? Why Fashion Companies Spend Big on Lobbying Governments’ 
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rather than inspiring it.116 It is not surprising, then, that the legislative history of the 
fashion bills reflects sensitivity to the costs of unnecessary new rights.117  
 
Finally, the long history of failed attempts at sui generis design protection no doubt 
played an unstated role in the latest bills’ failure. Fashion designers have complained 
about copying for well over a century, and Congress has repeatedly come close to 
relenting, but ultimately resisted. Although new technology has sped the pace of 
copying, it has not produced any fundamental change in the economic structure of the 
fashion industry. Absent some evidence that new conditions raise a heightened risk of 




Given the fraught history of design legislation in the US, the new popularity of design 
patent law, and the different philosophical foundations of intellectual property law in 
Europe and the United States, the US may never adopt the “design approach” and 
create a Community Design System-like regime. Indeed, unless the popularity of 
design patents begins to reverse itself, there may be little push for such a system for 
anything other than fashion.  
 
Yet history suggests that the fashion industry, at least, will someday renew its appeal 
for industry-specific protection. To some extent, the success of that appeal will depend 
on factors such as the political climate and the legislature’s overall level of function (or 
dysfunction). But it will also turn on evidence – evidence that fashion design 
protection will not only benefit designers, but will improve overall welfare in the US 
fashion market. Empirical studies of the price and quality effects of the Community 
Design System, for example, could inform the conversation; so could data on licensing 
practices in the US compared to Europe. Such evidence might make the case that 
design protection fits into the utilitarian architecture of US intellectual property law; 




116 See, e.g., J. Bessen and M. J. Meurer, ‘A Third of the Economy Is At Stake – and Patent Trolls Are to 
Blame’ (Wash. Post 18 November 2015), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
theory/wp/2015/11/18/patent-trolls-are-costing-us-billions-they-must-be-
stopped/?utm_term=.e08dd01243c7> accessed 24 November 2017.  
117 See S. Rep. No. 112-259 at 9 [2012] (Minority Views on 2012 bill) (“We have learned from experience 
that legislation has many consequences, some of which can be unintended, unforeseen, and negative. 
That same experience reveals a legislative propensity towards expanding rights once created. By 
contrast, Congress has been much less successful paring down statutory rights, even where evidence 
demonstrates that such rights have become overly-broad.”). 
